One idea which keeps coming up again and again is the notion of "tacit knowledge" developed by Polanyi. Some kinds of knowledge can’t be articulated: how, for example, do we recognize a face? We all do it, but try explaining how it happens to someone else. Polanyi’s argument is that much technical and craft work relies heavily on such tacit knowledge, which is why it must be taught through apprenticeship and example, not simply via textbook.
Polanyi contrasted tacit knowledge with knowledge that is codifiable: knowledge which can be transmitted from one person to another indirectly, without "hands on" interaction and demonstration. In practice, knowledge is codifiable if it can be learned from written documents.
Many authors have used Polanyi's idea in a way which confounds three distinct notions. The first is tacit knowledge in Polanyi’s original sense: knowledge which can’t be articulated. The important point about such tacit knowledge is that it can’t be codified or formalized (or at least, doing so is impractical).
The second notion, routinely confounded with inarticulate knowledge, is local knowledge. Local knowledge is knowledge of particular circumstances: the way things work at one time and place. Knowing where to hit the soda machine in the office basement in order to make it give back your money is local knowledge. Knowing that it’s a good idea to move into the left lanes as you pass the jail in San Francisco on eastbound I-80 in rush hour is local knowledge. Knowing who shouldn’t be seated next to whom at a dinner party you’re planning is local knowledge. None of these is tacit knowledge, because in each case, the knowledge can easily be passed to someone else.
The standard example used to illustrate the idea of tacit knowledge is the notion that laboratory procedures (especially new ones) can't be taught via textbook, but must be shown via hands-on, face-to-face contact. This is often true, but it's a bad example just because the situation confounds these two ideas.
The third notion often mixed up with the idea of tacit knowledge is private knowledge. Everyone has knowledge that no one else does; but that doesn't, by itself, make the knowledge inarticulate. Inarticulate knowledge is typically private, of course, but the reverse is hardly necessary. Local knowledge is knowledge about a particular time and place, knowledge of a particular subject-matter. Private knowledge is knowledge held solely by a person or group, i.e., by particular knowers.
Why bother with the nit-picking distinctions? There are several reasons, beside a taste for clarity and an aversion to research by bumper-sticker. When we tease out the different kinds of knowledge involved in most examples, we find that tacit knowledge is much less important as a factor in organizing affairs. Certainly, there are things which we can recognize but not define; pornography is a famous example. But local and private concerns are not, in general, inarticulate. Hence, the inarticulate character of some knowledge can't be used to define, defend or privilege local or private concerns.
One such sort of concern often treated this way is rights, especially rights in property. Such rights are always local, often private, and never inarticulate. Treating property rights as somehow constituted or privileged by "tacit" knowledge (as, for example, Virginia Postrel does here) is simply to add confusion to a difficult series of research and policy problems. There are many other examples of this confounding; it's worth some effort to avoid them in the future.
Polanyi, M. The Tacit Dimension. New York: Doubleday, 1967